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ABSTRACT 
Using an experimental methodology, I examine the productivity effects of increases in wages due 
to an externally imposed mandate in comparison to wage increases due to the generosity of the 
employer. This paper also introduces a new experimental framework for exploring the concept of 
gift-exchange in labor markets using groups of participants acting as employers and employees on 
a real effort task. We find that there is a significant effect of wages on effort levels. In addition, 
we find that when wages are increased due to an external mandate—all else equal—workers 
increase their effort levels by less than if their wages were increased due to an active choice by 
their employer. 
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I. Introduction 
With many politicians and economists alike supporting an increase in the minimum wage, 
it is important to consider the economic consequences of such a policy. Several politicians and 
public figures reference research regarding gift-exchange in labor markets in their support of 
raising the minimum wage. Existing research suggests that offering employees above-equilibrium 
wages results in employees providing effort levels beyond those otherwise required. Some argue 
that increasing the minimum wage would have the same effect. Higher productivity levels from 
workers would then offset some of the costs incurred by the employer for giving higher wages. 
One proponent of this concept is Costco Senior Vice President Jeff Long who claimed, concerning 
raising the New York minimum wage, “Instead of minimalizing wages, we know it’s a lot more 
profitable for the long term to minimize employee turnover and maximize productivity.” But might 
there be a difference in Costco paying its workers more and the government ordering Costco to 
pay its workers more? The literature of gift-exchange seems to suggest that it is a model based on 
reciprocity and generosity. An employee who receives a wage increase due to an external mandate 
might not feel the same desire to reciprocate as one who receives a wage increase due to an active 
choice on the part of their employer.  
I use a laboratory experiment in order to test this hypothesis. Using a novel design featuring 
simulated labor markets and a governing entity, I was able to isolate the effect of the context of an 
external mandate on worker productivity. The results confirm my hypothesis—workers do not 
respond to wage increases due to government policy in the same way that they respond to 
employer-chosen wage increases. While under both contexts workers increase their productivity 
after receiving an increased wage, this increase is significantly larger when the employer chooses 
the wage rather than being forced to increase the wage. 
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II. Existing Literature 
The existing belief that higher wages can cause higher worker productivity stems largely 
from a concept of economics called “gift-exchange.” The term gift-exchange refers to when goods 
or services are given from one party to another with no explicit request or demand for reciprocity. 
Instead of being governed by market forces, gift-exchanges are controlled by social norms. In his 
seminal 1982 paper, George Akerlof made the claim that labor markets are actually partial gift-
exchanges. He comes to this conclusion after finding that, in the field, many workers greatly 
exceeded minimum work standards, despite being paid a flat rate for their efforts. In labor market 
gift-exchange, Akerlof claimed that workers exchanged a “gift” of work more than the minimum 
work standard and, in exchange, the firms gave the “gift” of wages above what workers could 
receive if they left their current jobs. While this paper used empirical data to create a theoretical 
model for gift-exchange in labor markets, further research in gift-exchange was largely dominated 
by experimental economics.  
One such paper was written by Fehr et al (1993). In their experiment, as with many that 
explore the topic of gift-exchange, they created a labor market in which some participants are 
employers and some are employees. Employers select wages they would pay workers, and workers 
choose levels of “effort.” The pay-outs of employers depend on the effort levels of workers, while 
the pay-outs of employees depend on the wages set by their employers. Using this methodology, 
Fehr found that workers’ efforts varied positively with wage payments. That is, when workers 
were paid more they typically chose higher effort levels. This finding supports Akerlof’s beliefs 
that the labor market is a partial gift-exchange.  
Another experimental study by Brandts and Charness (2004) looked more specifically at 
the effect of having a minimum wage on workers’ effort levels in these gift-exchange conditions. 
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They did this by creating a treatment in which the employers in the game could not offer wages 
below a certain amount. They found that the mere inclusion of a minimum wage caused effort 
levels to decrease, especially at wages near the minimum wage. One reason this may have 
happened was that workers attributed less of the wage amount as a “gift” from the employers, and 
thus felt less need to exchange a gift of higher effort level in return. Thus, one could conclude that 
the type of reciprocity generated in gift-exchanges is due to the perceived kindness and generosity 
of the firm, rather than the raw absolute value of the gift in question. This conclusion is backed by 
a theoretical framework laid out in Rabin (1993). In this paper, a model of fairness-based 
reciprocity is proposed. Such a reciprocity is driven by concepts of niceness and fairness on behalf 
of both parties, and equilibria created from these standards could vary from those obtained via 
normal economic standards for equilibria.  
Another recent study, Gilchrist et al (2013), looks closely at how the context of wages 
influences worker effort. In order to vary the contexts of given wages, this study makes use of a 
field experiment with a real-effort task. The experiment consisted of three treatments. In the first, 
workers are paid a wage of $3. In the second, the workers are paid a wage of $4. In the last 
treatment, participants are told they will be paid a wage of $3, but then shortly before commencing 
work they are told that they will be paid an extra $1 as well. Despite the differences in wage, 
workers in the first two treatments produced similar levels of output. In the third treatment, 
however, workers were significantly more productive, despite their absolute pay being the same 
as in the second treatment. The explanation for this phenomenon is that in treatments one and two, 
the wage is simply perceived as the “going-rate” for the work, eliciting similar productivity 
outputs. In the third treatment, the extra $1 is perceived as a gift above the “going-rate” from the 
employer, and thus the workers reciprocate with higher levels of output. Thus, the context seems 
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to be of high importance in determining the productivity effects of a certain wage. This conclusion 
supports my hypothesis that the context of a mandated wage increase would affect worker 
productivity outcomes. 
While the field of gift-exchange has been thoroughly explored by experimental economists, 
there is still room for further examination. From previously done work, we know that employees 
are likely to increase their efforts given an increase in wages. We also see that a key reason this 
exchange happens is because of social norms to reciprocate kindness and fairness. However, most 
gift-exchange papers look at one-shot games. That is, they tend to look at how workers respond to 
the initial wage offered by employers and do not often look at what happens to workers’ effort 
when an employer decides to change the wage of their workers. Specifically, one area that has 
remained rather unexplored, is how the actual context of wage increases affects worker 
productivity. While Gilchrist et al found that the framing of a wage increase as a “gift” increased 
worker productivity, I found no other papers discussing other possible contexts of pay raises. 
Brandts and Charness found that productivity decreased given the introduction of a minimum 
wage, but no experimental papers to my knowledge look at the productivity effects of an increase 
in an already existing minimum wage, which is possibly more relevant to the current state of the 
U.S. labor market. Thus, this paper introduces a useful extension of existing literature. 
III. DESIGN 
 In order to test my hypotheses, I have developed an experimental framework to model a 
small labor market within a laboratory setting. This experimental framework was conducted using 
the software Z-Tree, in the Economics Lab at Ohio State (Fischbacher 2007). Each session of the 
experiment was composed of between 12 and 30 participants, with participants randomly sorted 
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into groups of six. Each group acts as a simulated “firm” with one “employer” and five 
“employees”. 
 The employer of each group is responsible for choosing the wages of the employees, under 
restrictions imposed by the experimenter. The employees receive these wages in exchange for 
providing labor in a real-effort task. This task is adapted directly from the “slider” task proposed 
by Gill and Prowse (2012). In this task, participants are shown a digital “slider” located on a line 
segment (an image of this task is located in the Appendix). To complete one “slide”, participants 
must click and drag the slider to the middle of the segment, where the slide takes on a value of 
“50”. Performance in this task has been shown to be very responsive to levels of participant effort, 
and thus provides us an excellent task to assign to employees in order to gauge their effort levels. 
As is standard in labor market gift-exchange experiment designs, the payouts of the employers and 
the employees are determined as functions of the effort levels of the employees (in the form of raw 
output in the slider task) and the wages set by employers. The pay-out for employees was equal to 
the wage selected by their employer for the given work period. The pay-out for employers is 
determined by the following formula: 
 
That is, employers begin with an allotment of $10 for each round. Their final payout is equal to 
this initial allotment, minus the wage selected for a random employee, plus $0.40 for each slide 
this random employee completes. The payout of the employer was determined based off only one 
of their randomly selected employees. The payout for all participants was determined only from 
one randomly selected round. All of this information is available to all participants throughout the 
duration of experiment. 
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 A session consists of five three-minute rounds of work. The employer does not see the 
effort levels of employees for any current or previous rounds, until the end of the experiment. 
Before each round of work, the employer sets the wages of each employee, under restrictions that 
vary by round and treatment. 
 The experiment consists of three treatments: control, mandate, and gift. The treatments 
varied by session, with all participants in a session receiving the same treatment throughout the 
duration of the experiment. Across all treatments, in the first two rounds of work employers are 
forced to set the wage of each employee to $8. The first two rounds are set at the same wage in 
order to acclimate participants to the structure of the task. By doing this, effort changes in future 
rounds are much more likely to be due to our treatments and not due to factors such as learning. 
 In the control treatment, employees work all five rounds at the constant wage of $8 for 
each round of work. Including a control group allows us to differentiate the effects of our 
treatments from other possible explanations.  
 In the mandate treatment, all participants are notified prior to round three that the 
employers are now mandated to increase the wage of each employee from $8 to $10. In this 
treatment, the experimental design allows the experimenter to act as an external governing force, 
similar to the way the government could force employers to pay higher wages through policy 
action. 
 In the gift treatment, all participants are notified prior to round three that the employers 
now have the choice to raise the wages of each employee from $8 to $10. The employer may 
choose to give this raise to any number of the employees, including none of them at all. Because 
no information on previous employee performance is given to employers, this wage increase can 
only be given as an act of generosity, and not as a response to previous performance (which allows 
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us to avoid endogeneity in the selection of those who receive raises). Throughout rounds three 
through five, employees will work for either the increased wage of $10 or the previous wage of 
$8, depending on the employer’s choice following round two.  
 From this experimental design, the main statistic of interest is the change of worker output 
between rounds. Specifically, we are interested in the difference in these changes between the three 
treatments. As per my hypothesis, I expected that worker output increases by significantly more 
in the gift treatment than in the mandate treatment, contingent to wages being increased in the gift 
treatment. However, I also expected both treatments to experience larger increases in productivity 
than in the control, which should not see any significant increases in productivity between rounds. 
Also of interest is the endurance of these productivity effects in each case. By having five rounds 
of work, we are able to see how long the boost in productivity from these wage increases lasts. 
Similar to my other hypothesis, I expected the productivity boosts to last much longer in the gift 
treatment. 
IV. Results 
Over the course of four months, I ran 18 sessions consisting of 348 total participants. Of 
these 348 participants, 58 were employers and 290 were employees. Of the 290 employees, 35 
were in the Control treatment, 80 were in the Mandate treatment, and 175 were in the Gift 
treatment. Of the 175 in the Gift treatment, 60 employees received wage increases and 115 
employees did not receive wage increases. The demographics of the participants across these 
various treatments are in the Table (1) in the Appendix. Demographically, these treatments are 
fairly identical, consisting of similar proportions of genders, majors, and native speaking ability.  
The control group does have a disproportionate amount of non-native English speakers, however 
later regression analysis shows that native English speaking is not correlated with effort levels of 
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participants, so this is not of much concern. Since the demographics of our treatments are 
inconsequentially different, we can compare the average effort levels by round for each treatment. 
 Examining the graph above, one can observe the trends in effort levels of employees over 
time, by treatment. As treatments are identical in the first two rounds across all treatments, 
differences in effort levels for both rounds are likely due simply to randomness and noise. Between 
rounds one and two, all treatments saw a very similar increase in average effort levels. This 
increase is likely due to participants simply learning how the slider task works over time. The 
treatments begin to distinguish themselves after round 2, when wage increases occur (or in some 
cases, do not occur). Participants in both the Mandate treatment and in the Gift treatment receive 
an equal raise of $2.00 for their work. In response, both types of participants increase their effort 
levels. However, those who receive a wage increase due to an employer gift increase their effort 
by more than those who receive a wage increase due to an external mandate. After round three, 
both those who receive wage increases in the gift treatment and those who receive them in the 
mandate treatment continue to gradually increase their effort levels, however these increases are 
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almost identical. This signifies an initial boost in productivity in workers who receive increases in 
the Gift treatment that endures, but does not increase, throughout the remainder of the experiment. 
 In contrast to the treatments where employees receive a raise, in the Control treatment 
employees receive no raise. In response, the effort levels of employees in the Control treatment 
seem to stagnate, with little to no change occurring in effort levels past the second round. It is 
important to note that those in the Control treatment were not aware of any possibility of their 
wages changing, and thus their trend can be looked at as the natural trend in effort levels over time 
given conditions such as learning, fatigue, and boredom. Those in the Gift treatment who do not 
receive a wage increase, however, are aware that a wage increase was possible, even though they 
did not receive one. As is expected, their effort levels decrease following round two, as a sort of 
negative reciprocity towards their employer. 
 Thus, an initial look at our results suggests that our hypothesis was correct. While 
employees do react positively to a wage increase in any context, they increase their efforts by more 
when their wage increase is due to employer generosity.  
 Traditional t-tests agree with this finding, as seen in the following table. 
 
The variable of interest here is the difference in effort levels between rounds two and three. 
Each column represents the difference in these differences between various treatments. Both the 
differences in the Gift treatment and in the Mandate treatment are significantly greater than in the 
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Control treatment. Even more importantly, the difference in the Gift treatment is significantly 
greater than the difference in the Mandate treatment. Thus, we can conclude that effort levels 
increase by more in the Gift treatment than in the Mandate treatment. While the average difference 
in effort levels decreases when a gift is not received in the Gift treatment, it is not significantly 
different from the control group.  
 Our data is very noisy with a lot of outliers in both directions. Thus, perhaps a more 
accurate way to test our hypotheses is via a Mann-Whitney Rank Sum Test. Using this test, we 
found that the differences in effort levels between rounds two and three were significantly different 
(at p=0.0013) between the Gift and Mandate treatments. Interestingly, when using this test the 
difference between the Mandate and Control treatments is no longer significant, suggesting the 
Mandate treatment was subject to more outliers than the other treatments. Thus, Mann-Whitney 
tests suggest that the increase in effort levels after a mandated wage increase is not significantly 
different from the increase in effort levels after no wage increase at all. 
 Also of interest to our hypothesis was the endurance of these effects. That is, to what degree 
do the treatment effects persist after the initial wage increases. I was able to determine this via 
regression analysis. Clustering standard errors by subject, I ran the following regression: 
 
Where Effortit is equal to the number of slides completed by employee i in round t, Roundt is 
equal to the number of the round past round three, Treatmenti is a dummy equal to 1 if employee 
i is in the Gift treatment group and equal to 0 if employee i is in the Mandate treatment group. 
We are able to assume a linear time trend as long as we restrict our regression to rounds three 
through five (which is when the raise has been implemented). 
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The results of this regression are located in Table (2) in the Appendix. The significance on 
the Treatment variable confirms the results of our hypothesis tests—there is in fact an initial boost 
in effort levels of those in the gift treatment over those in the mandate treatment after a wage 
increase. However, the coefficient of the interaction term is not significant in either specification. 
The interpretation of this is that those who receive wage increases due to an employer gift do 
increase their effort levels by more than those who receive them due to an external mandate—
however, following this initial boost, their effort levels increase at similar rates. Since time trends 
of the effort levels are identical between the two treatments after this initial boost in productivity 
for those in the gift treatment, this boost endures—but does not grow—over time. 
 At the end of the experiment, participants were also given a brief survey that asked them 
questions concerning their beliefs throughout the experiment. These beliefs included questions 
about their perception of their employer’s generosity, their own generosity, what they believed a 
fair wage would be, and in what rounds they put in the most or least effort. T-Tests on the 
differences in answers to these questions between treatments are in Table (3) in the Appendix. 
Perceptions of generosity are measured on a 5-point scale, with 1 being the least generous 
and 5 being the most generous. Employee perceptions of employer generosity are significantly 
higher in both the mandate treatment and in the gift treatment when compared to the control 
treatment. This suggests that effort levels are in fact correlated to employee’s perceptions of 
employer generosity. Likewise, the perceptions of employer generosity are higher in the Gift 
treatment than in the Mandate treatment; however, this difference is not statistically significant so 
this cannot be taken as conclusive evidence that employee’s believe their employer is being more 
generous in the gift treatment than in the mandate treatment. Across all treatments employees 
seemed to agree that a fair wage for their work would be around $10, however this is not surprising 
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as $10 was the maximum wage choice they could have selected in response to this question. 
Additionally, rounds where employees felt they put in the most or least effort correlated strongly 
with their actual raw effort levels (in units of slides completed), suggesting that slides completed 
was an appropriate measure of employee effort.  
V. Conclusion 
Using an experimental methodology, I found that levels of gift-exchange in labor markets 
do vary by context. Central to the concept of gift-exchange are the virtues of generosity and 
reciprocity. Thus, levels of gift-exchange are highest when these two qualities are most present. 
These situations include those which are typically referenced in gift-exchange literature, situations 
where wages are increased simply out of the generosity on the part of the employer. On the other 
hand, when a government policy such as a minimum wage increase causes wages to increase, 
levels of gift-exchange are significantly lower. In fact, due to the absence of an element of 
generosity in these scenarios, wage increases here may not even be considered “gift-exchange” at 
all, but rather simply an instance of “other-regarding preferences”. In my experiment, I directly 
compared the effort levels, across time, of employees in these various contexts. While employees 
do put in more effort when their wage increases—in any context—they respond with even more 
effort when this increase is due to a gift and not due to a mandate. The “gift” context provides an 
initial boost in effort levels directly after the wage increase that endures over time.  
These findings do not necessarily suggest a raise in the minimum wage is a bad thing for 
the nation’s economy. Many other factors play an important role in deciding this issue—factors 
like employment levels are absent from the design of this experiment. However, this study 
provides an important addition to the literature on the economic effects of increasing the 
minimum wage. Policymakers must understand that when increasing wages via legislation will 
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not have the same effect on worker productivity as pay raises in other contexts, and they must 
take this into account when deciding on policies pertaining to the minimum wage. 
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Appendix 
Table (1): Summary Statistics of Control Variables across Treatments 
 
Table (2): Regression of Effort Levels over Time 
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Table (3): T-Tests on Survey Questions across Treatments 
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Attachment (1): Experiment Instructions 
Decision Making Study Instructions 
Overview: 
 Welcome, you will be participating in an economics experiment that aims to learn 
more about the nature of labor markets. Participation should take less than one hour 
and payment will be given at the conclusion of the experiment. Throughout the duration 
of the experiment, please do not talk to the other participants and do not use your cell 
phones or other electronic devices. 
 For this experiment, you will be randomly assigned into groups of six, with each 
group containing one “employer” and five “employees”. At the beginning of the 
experiment, you will be randomly assigned as either an employer or an employee. You 
will be notified of your position assignment in the beginning of this experiment. 
Throughout the five rounds of the game, employees will be working on a 
computer task. The earnings of the employer will be determined by the performance of 
employees on this task, and the earnings of the employees will be determined by wages 
selected by the employer. At the end of the experiment, one round out of the five will be 
selected at random for payment. 
Role of the “Employee”: 
 At the beginning of each round, employees will be told their wage for the 
upcoming round of work. This wage will be set by the employer of each group, under 
certain restrictions imposed by the experimenter that will be communicated to all 
participants prior to each round. Then, employees will participate in an electronic slider 
task. Employees will see on their screens a series of electronic “sliders”. You must then 
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drag the electronic slider to the number 50, stated on the screen. For each “slide” 
completed, the employer will receive $0.30. The payout of the employee DOES NOT 
depend on the number of sliders that employee completes. The number of slides 
completed by an employee determines only the payout of the EMPLOYER. The only 
determinant of an employees payout is the wage assigned by their employer. 
Employees will have four minutes in each round to complete as many sliders as 
they can. The payout of an employee for any given round is the wage set by the 
employer for that round.  
You will complete five rounds of work, and one round will be randomly chosen as 
the round for pay-out at the end of this experiment.  
Role of the “Employer”: 
At the beginning of each round, the employer of each firm will be given $8 for 
each employee in their firm. The employer must then select a wage to pay each 
employee. This wage will be selected under certain restrictions imposed by the 
experimenter that will be communicated to all participants prior to the start of the round. 
The employer’s earnings for each round will be determined as follows by the efforts of 
one randomly selected employee: 
Earnings = $8 – (Wage of Radom Employee) + $0.30(# of sliders completed by 
Random employee) 
That is, the earnings of the employer will be determined by subtracting the wage 
chosen for the randomly selected employee from the initial $8, and then adding $0.30 
for each slide completed by that randomly selected employee. Employers will not be 
able to see the output of employees for any previous or current rounds. Employers will 
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also not be shown their pay-out of any rounds except for at the end of the experiment, 
when they will be notified of their pay-out for the randomly select round for payment. 
Payment: 
 At the conclusion of the experiment, participants will be notified of a random 
round selected for payment. Employers will receive their assigned wage for this round in 
addition to a $5.00 show-up fee. Employees will be notified of a random employee 
selected for the calculation of their earnings as determined by the above underlined 
equations, in addition to a $5.00 show-up fee. 
 
 
Quiz 
1. Suppose you are randomly assigned as an employee. Your payment at the end 
of this experiment depends on: 
a) The wage assigned by the employer of your group 
b) The # of sliders you complete 
c) The # of sliders completed by others in your group 
 
2. Suppose you are randomly assigned as an employer. Your earnings depend on 
(check all that apply): 
a) The wage you assigned a randomly selected employee 
b) The wages you assigned to all employees in your group 
c) The efforts of a randomly selected employee 
d) The efforts of all employees in your group 
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3. True or False: You will be paid based on all rounds of the experiment 
 
4. True or False: You will be paid a show-up fee of $5 in addition to your other 
earnings 
 
Instructions seen on screen by participants during the GIFT treatment: 
Beginning of Rounds 1-2: 
Read out loud by proctor: For this round, all employers are mandated to pay a wage of $5 to 
each employee. 
Employers see: You must now assign wages to your employees. You have 5 employees. For 
this round you are mandated to pay each employee $5. Remember you have been given $8 to 
spend on each employee's wage. Your payment will be calculated using the formula: $8 - 
WAGE + $0.30*(# of sliders) for one randomly selected employee. 
Employees see: Your employer is currently selecting your wage. For this round the 
experimenter has mandated that all wages be set at $5. 
Beginning of Round 3: 
Read out loud by proctor: For this round, employers have the choice to increase the wage of 
each employee from $5 to $8. This wage increase will stay in effect for rounds 3 through 5. 
Employers see: You may now choose whether or not to increase the wages of any employees 
from $5 to $8. Keep in mind employees will see the wage you choose. Employees may decide 
to work more and complete more sliders if you decide to increase their wages. The wage you 
select now will stay in effect for rounds 3 through 5. Remember you have been given $8 to 
spend on each employee's wage. Your payment will be calculated using the formula: $8 - 
WAGE + $0.30*(# of sliders) for one randomly selected employee. 
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Employees see: Your employer now has the option to increase your wage from $5 to $8. Please 
wait while they decide. 
Beginning of Rounds 4-5: 
Read out loud by proctor: For this round, wages will remain the same as the wages chosen by 
employers in round 3. 
Employers see: For this round, wages will remain the same as you selected in Round 3. 
Remember you have been given $8 to spend on each employee's wage. Your payment will be 
calculated using the formula: $8 - WAGE + $0.30*(# of sliders) for one randomly selected 
employee. 
Employees see: Your wages for this round will remain the same as the wages set from Round 
3. 
Instructions seen on screen by participants during the MANDATE treatment: 
Beginning of Rounds 1-2: 
Read out loud by proctor: For this round, all employers are mandated to pay a wage of $5 to 
each employee. 
Employers see: You must now assign wages to your employees. You have 5 employees. For 
this round you are mandated to pay each employee $5. Remember you have been given $8 to 
spend on each employee's wage. Your payment will be calculated using the formula: $8 - 
WAGE + $0.30*(# of sliders) for one randomly selected employee. 
Employees see: Your employer is currently selecting your wage. For this round the 
experimenter has mandated that all wages be set at $5. 
Beginning of Round 3: 
Read out loud by proctor: All employers are now mandated to increase the wages of all 
employees from $5 to $8. This increase will stay in effect for rounds 3 through 5.  
Employers see: You are now mandated to increase the wages of any employees from $5 to $8. 
This new wage will stay in effect for rounds 3 through 5. Remember you have been given $8 to 
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spend on each employee's wage. Your payment will be calculated using the formula: $8 - 
WAGE + $0.30*(# of sliders) for one randomly selected employee. 
Employees see: Your employer now has now been mandated by the experimenter to increase 
your wage from $5 to $8. Please wait while they decide. 
Beginning of Rounds 4-5: 
Read out loud by proctor: For this round, wages will remain the same as the wages in round 3. 
Employers see: For this round, wages will remain the same as in Round 3. Remember you have 
been given $8 to spend on each employee's wage. Your payment will be calculated using the 
formula: $8 - WAGE + $0.30*(# of sliders) for one randomly selected employee. 
Employees see: Because the wage increase mandate is still in effect, your wages will remain 
the same as they were in round 3.  
Instructions seen on screen by participants during the CONTROL treatment: 
Beginning of Rounds 1-5: 
Read out loud by proctor: For this round, all employers are mandated to pay a wage of $5 to 
each employee. 
Employers see: You must now assign wages to your employees. You have 5 employees. For 
this round you are mandated to pay each employee $5. Remember you have been given $8 to 
spend on each employee's wage. Your payment will be calculated using the formula: $8 - 
WAGE + $0.30*(# of sliders) for one randomly selected employee. 
Employees see: Your employer is currently selecting your wage. For this round the 
experimenter has mandated that all wages be set at $5. 
  
 
 
 
   Spurlino 25 
Attachment (2): Screenshot of Slider Task 
 
 
